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Following the Leader: The Impact of Presidential Campaign Visits on Legislative Support for the President's Policy Preferences

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Although scholars have studied presidential legislative success for decades, they have tended to focus on the same causal factors. I investigated the effect of presidential campaign visits to congressional candidates on legislative support for the president's preferences in order to push for innovation within the literature that discusses presidential legislative success. I used data from the 1994 midterms and the 104th Congress and the 2002 midterms and the 108th Congress. Regressions and predicted probability calculations revealed that members of the 104th Congress as a whole were more likely to vote for the president's preferences at the beginning of the Congress when they received campaign visits and this support decreased over time. This study also found that Democrats and Republicans in the 104th Congress responded to visits with increased support for the president's preferences. This support varied over time for Democrats and over margins of victory for Republicans

Scholars have studied the causal factors of presidential legislative success for decades, but the length of time for which this research has continued belies its narrow scope. This body of research consists of the same independent variables being used over and over again to explain presidential legislative success and, as a result, the literature treats these variables as *faits accomplis*. By failing to innovate in regard to presidential legislative success, scholars have largely ignored other causal factors that may have small effects on presidential legislative success. Presidential campaign visits to congressional candidates may be one of these ignored causal factors.

I examined the impact of presidential campaign visits on legislative support for the president's policy preferences for members of the 104th Congress and members of the 108th Congress. Regressions and predicted probabilities revealed that members of the 104th Congress were more likely to vote in support of the president's preferences when they or their opponent received a campaign visit in the last midterm election and that this support decreased over time. Breaking the 104th Congress down by party revealed that Democrats followed the pattern of increased support with visits that decreased over the course of the Congress. However, only Republicans who won their seats by margins of victory of less than 10% were more likely to support the president's policy preferences when they faced opponents who received one or more visit from the president in the previous midterm. Additionally, the increased support for the president's preferences from these Republicans did not vary over time. Instead, the impact of visits on support for Republicans in the 104th Congress who won their districts by a margin of less than 10% varied by margin of victory; the impact of visits diminished as a Republican's margin of victory increased up to 10%. The results for members of the 108th Congress were less

clear, which could be a result of the lack of votes at the beginning of the 108th Congress included in the data.

Nonetheless, a relationship between visits and support is evident in the 104th Congress. The existence of this relationship demonstrates to scholars that they ought to be more inventive when researching presidential success in Congress. This relationship has a practical significance as well; understanding it could help pundits better analyze presidential travel and assist presidential administrations when planning legislative strategy.

Literature Review

Campaign Visits

Previous studies have mostly focused on debating a small group of causal factors of presidential legislative success. Some of these factors are presidential skill, presidential popularity, and partisan composition of Congress. Given the monomaniacal focus on this small group of factors, it is hardly surprising that there exists very little scholarship that explores the effect of presidential campaign visits on legislative support for the president's preferences. The only study that tests campaign visits as a causal factor of presidential legislative success does find a significant relationship between the two variables for incumbent members, but this study is highly flawed (Herrnson and Morris 2006a). First, the authors only examine the impact of campaign visits on the president's co-partisans during the 108th session of Congress and, as such, their results may not be generalizable. Further, the authors measure presidential success as an aggregate score of the number of times an individual member of Congress voted in favor of the president's positions in a year. The use of an aggregate measure means that the authors may have missed patterns in the timing of voting in support of the president's agenda.

Moreover, the study is methodologically flawed. The authors fail to control for many of the variables traditionally correlated with presidential legislative success. Most significantly, the

authors do not control for party membership. While they control for ideological distance from the president, party membership may have an independent effect and ought to be included as a separate control variable. Further, the authors measure an important confounding variable inadequately. Specifically, they measure presidential popularity by using the portion of the vote that Bush received in individual districts (Herrnson and Morris 2006a). While this probably does factor into the decisions made by members of Congress, this measure does not wholly encompass presidential popularity. There is a huge amount of time in between presidential elections and the Congress after the next midterm election and members of Congress probably define presidential popularity through something more immediate, like opinion polls. The authors' failure to accurately operationalize presidential popularity and to include other control variables makes it unlikely that their results can be trusted.

Because of the fact that no adequate studies exist on the potential relationship between campaign visits and presidential legislative success, it is necessary to look to other bodies of literature to find support for hypotheses regarding the effect of visits on support. The body of literature that discusses the president's motivations for midterm campaigning gives insight into the mechanisms that may link presidential campaign visits and presidential legislative success and the literature that discusses the changing nature of congressional campaigns sheds light on when presidential campaign visits may be more likely to impact legislative support for the president's policy preferences.

Presidential Motivations for Campaign Visits

There are many studies that focus on why presidents make campaign visits. Some of these studies claim that the president campaigns for his party's candidates in order to increase the seats held by his co-partisans in Congress, which makes it easier for him to pass his agenda (Keele, Fogarty, and Stimson 2004; Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004). Other scholars argue

that presidents campaign for their co-partisans in order to make members of Congress feel indebted to them and vote in favor of their policy positions if they are elected (Keele 2009; Hoddie and Routh 2004; Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus 2004). According to these scholars, members of Congress who received campaign visits in the previous election feel that they owe their seat, at least in part, to the president and this debt translates into support for the president's policy agenda in Congress. Finally, other scholars posit that the president campaigns for specific candidates to reward past support for his policy preferences. The studies that test this hypothesis find no relationship between a candidate's past support for the president and being a recipient of a presidential campaign visit (Herrnson and Morris 2006b, 2007).

The body of literature that discusses the president's motives for campaigning for his co-partisans is relevant to the examination of presidential campaign visits and legislative support for a few reasons. First, this body of literature recognizes, at least theoretically, that campaign visits may be related to legislative support for the president's policy preferences. This literature's most important connection to the examination of campaign visits and legislative success is, however, its discussion of indebtedness and rewarding because this discussion reveals two mechanisms that may connect campaign visits and legislative support for the president's policy preferences. The idea that a member's perceived debt to the president causes support for his policy preferences is translated directly into one of my hypotheses. However, indebtedness as a connecting mechanism has not been empirically tested in this body of literature, so it only provides theoretical support for the indebtedness hypothesis.

The examination of campaign visits as a reward for prior support also provides insight into a potential link between campaign visits and support for the president's policy preferences. Despite the fact that the few studies that quantitatively test the impact of prior support on

campaign visits find no significant relationship, this mechanism may connect prior visits and support if members of Congress *think* that the president uses campaign visits as rewards. Because the body of literature about presidential motivations for visiting candidates looks at presidential decision-making and behavior, the quantitative tests can only show that the president does not use visits as rewards for previous support. I am interested in congressional behavior, so all that matters for my purposes is that members of Congress believe that the president uses campaign visits to reward loyal co-partisans. If this is the case, members may try to incentivize future campaign visits from the president by voting in favor of his policy preferences in Congress.

Changes in the Nature of Congressional Campaigns

The body of literature that examines the changing nature of congressional campaigns sheds light on when presidential campaign visits may be more likely to have an effect on legislative support for the president's policy preferences. There are two strands of this literature that are relevant for my purposes. The first strand is formed by studies that discuss the incumbency advantage. The second strand is formed by studies that discuss the decline of marginal districts. The first strand, the incumbency advantage literature, argues that a majority of incumbents are reelected with increasingly larger margins and that this occurs regardless of the political conditions at the time of elections (Abramowitz 1991, 34; Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006; Mattei and Glasgow 2005). The incumbency advantage has caused some scholars to conclude that presidents can have little, if any, impact on congressional elections (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 17). These scholars would likely argue that presidential campaign visits do not have an effect on legislative support because the incumbency advantage means incumbents do not depend on the president's assistance for fundraising, drawing in media attention, or rallying supporters. As such, even if members of Congress receive campaign visits from the president,

these members will not feel that they owe their election to his visit or that they will need a future visit from the president to get reelected. Under these conditions, therefore, neither indebtedness nor incentivizing will be effective in linking presidential campaign visits to legislative support.

These studies discuss the incumbency advantage as if it is absolute and unchanging, but in reality there are elections in which incumbents are defeated. It is possible that presidential visits may be perceived to have had an impact on victory when the incumbency advantage is not sufficient to secure an incumbent's seat. As such, if the incumbent faces a strong challenger in a competitive district, receives a campaign visit from the president, and wins the election then that member of Congress may be more likely to feel that their reelection is, in part, attributable to the president's assistance and feel indebted to him. Similarly, under such circumstances reelected members may feel that they will be likely to face another strong challenger in the next election cycle and, given the perceived impact of the president's visit in the previous election, will attempt to incentivize a future campaign visit by supporting the president's policy preferences.

Studies that discuss the decline in marginal districts form the second strand of the changing campaigns body of literature. According to scholars who explore this decrease, the incumbency advantage has resulted in fewer competitive districts and a corresponding increase in safe districts (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006; Griffin 2006). Prior research has found that marginal districts tend to produce moderate candidates who, when elected, are more willing to defect from their party's positions in Congress while safe districts have a tendency to produce more ideologically extreme representatives (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Donovan 2007; Froman 1963). One scholar explains these tendencies with overlapping "reelection constituencies," which exist when the president and an opposition party member share an electoral base. Because opposition party members depend on a constituency for

reelection that also supports the president, they are more likely than their co-partisans to defect from their party's position and vote in support of the president's policy preferences (Jacobson 2003a, 6). These overlapping constituencies are more likely to exist in competitive districts than in safe districts. However, because marginal districts are increasingly rare and because safe districts tend to produce extreme members, scholars in this body of literature would likely argue that the president cannot shore up future opposition member support by visiting his co-partisans. If a district is not competitive, then the president's visit will not be viewed as responsible for decreasing the opposition member's margin of victory and making the election closer.

These studies discuss marginal districts as though they have been entirely obliterated, but that is simply not the case. Even if marginal districts are becoming less common, there are always some competitive races during elections. If the opposition party member wins against a candidate who received a presidential visit in a marginal district, they are already more predisposed to support the president's policy preferences because they are more likely to share a reelection constituency with the president. However, the visit itself may make such members more likely to support the president's policy preferences because they will perceive the president's visit as responsible for increasing their opponent's vote share and making the election closer than it otherwise would have been.

When candidates campaign for seats in marginal districts the winner, whether it is the visited co-partisan or the opposition party member, may be more likely to support the president's policy preferences in response to a campaign visit. For the president's co-partisans, visits from the president may appear to increase their margins of victory, which will cause them to support his policy positions. This support may be because they feel that they owe their seats to the president's visit and wish to repay him or because they want to incentivize future campaign

visits. For opposition party members, presidential visits in the previous election may appear to have lowered their margins of victory which, counterintuitively, may make such members more likely to support the president's policy positions in order to appeal to their shared electoral constituencies.

Theory

I expect that presidential campaign visits will affect the voting behavior of the president's co-partisans for whom the president campaigned such that they will be more likely to vote in favor of his preferences. I have two competing theories that link visits and support, and these two theories lead to different expectations of the timing of support for the president's preferences in Congress. The first theory is that presidential campaign visits to congressional candidates and support for the president's desired policies are linked through indebtedness; members of Congress for whom the president campaigned believe that they owe loyalty to the president in return for the perceived role he played in getting them elected.

If the indebtedness theory is true, I suspect that members of Congress who received campaign visits from the president will be more likely to support the president's agenda at the beginning of the subsequent term of Congress, but that this support will fade over time. I expect support to decrease because members of Congress who received visits are unlikely to continuously feel indebted to the president. Once these members have voted in favor of the president's agenda a certain number of times, they are likely to feel that they have paid their debt to the president and their support level will decline. Because the indebtedness theory operates through the perceived impact of a presidential visit, I expect that the closer the margin of victory was for a given member of Congress who received a visit, the more supportive that member will be at the beginning of a congressional term. It should be noted that Herrnson and Morris share

part of this theory – that campaign visits and presidential success are linked by indebtedness and that the effect of visits is limited over time – but they do not elaborate on margins of victory, nor do they test for time effects beyond looking at levels of support between the first session of Congress and the second session.

My second competing theory that links presidential campaign visits and legislative support for the president's agenda relates to incentivizing future presidential support. The incentivizing theory is that members of Congress, who are constantly concerned with reelection, wish to secure future campaign visits from the president and believe that the best way to do so is to support the president's policy positions. If this theory is true, I expect members of Congress who received campaign visits in the previous midterm election to support the president's agenda at the beginning of the congressional term and *all* of the president's co-partisans to support the president's policy positions toward the end of the term. Co-partisans who received visits from the president will be more likely to support his agenda at the beginning of the term because they wish to demonstrate to the president that they will reward him for helping them get elected and that they will do so again if the president campaigns for them in future elections. Similarly, the president's co-partisans who vote in favor of the president's agenda at the end of a term attempt to incentivize presidential campaign visits in the upcoming election. By supporting the president's agenda at this stage, members of Congress signal to the president that they are willing to vote in line with his policy positions and that it is worth helping them get reelected because they will continue to do so in the future. Because incentivizing campaign visits in an upcoming election at the end of a term does not require previous campaign visits from the president, I expect all members of the president's party to be more supportive of his agenda at this stage. The degree of support for the president's agenda at both the beginning and end of the term is likely to

be dictated in part by each member's margin of victory in the previous election. Thus, individuals who won their districts by a smaller margin of victory will be more likely to support the president's preferences.

I expect that members of Congress from the opposition party who won their districts by a small margin will be more likely to support the president's agenda, relative to their co-partisans, in order to appease a more moderate constituency. I suspect that increased support may be more likely to occur toward the end of the Congress because reelection concerns will be more prominent as elections grow nearer.

Hypotheses

H_1: Members of Congress who received one or more campaign visits from the president during a midterm election and who won their districts by smaller margins will be more likely to support the president's policy preferences at the beginning of their terms

H_2: Members of Congress who received campaign visits from the president and who won their districts by smaller margins will be more likely to support the president's preferences at the beginning of their terms. Additionally, all of the president's co-partisans who won their seats by smaller margins will be more likely to support the president's policy preferences at the end of their terms.

H_3: Representatives from the opposition party who won their districts by smaller margins and whose opponents received one or more campaign visit will be more likely to support the president's policy preferences toward the end of their terms.

Data and Methods

In order to ensure that the results from this study are generalizable, I examined both the 1994 midterms and the subsequent 104th Congress and the 2002 midterms and the 108th

Congress. The 1994 midterm elections took place during President Clinton's first term and resulted in a massive Republican takeover of the House of Representatives. Therefore, voting in the 104th Congress took place in the context of divided government with Republicans in control of the House and with a Democratic president (Jacobson 1996). The 2002 midterms occurred during President Bush's first term and gave the Republican majority five additional seats in the House. As such, the Republican Party retained its majority in the House of Representatives and government was unified during the 108th Congress (Jacobson 2003b). Although both midterms took place during a president's first term, variation is provided by the compositions of the two Congresses. Given that this study is interested in presidential-congressional relations, the variation provided by using a period of divided government after the president's party lost the House and a period of unified government after the president's party retained the House is particularly appropriate.

In order to test my hypotheses, I created separate data sets for the 104th Congress and the 108th Congress. Specifically, I created panel data sets arranged alphabetically by member of Congress. I chose to examine key domestic and economic policy votes on which the president took a position.[i] There were 22 such votes during the 104th Congress and 13 such votes during the 108th Congress. The dependent variable is support for the president's policy preferences. This dichotomous variable was coded 1 if a member of Congress voted in favor of the president's position on a given vote. If a member of Congress voted against the president's preference on a given vote then the variable was coded 0. Each member's vote was coded for all of the identified key votes. The primary independent variable is the number of visits received by the president's co-partisan in each race during the previous midterm election. For members of the president's party who won the election, this variable is coded as the number of visits made by the president

to their state during which the president explicitly advocated for their election. For members of Congress who belonged to the opposition party, the visits variable is coded as the number of these visits received by their opponents in the election. Members of Congress who ran unopposed in the midterm election and members who did not run against a candidate from the president's party were omitted. I expect that visits will have a positive coefficient, which will indicate that visits increased a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences when time was equal to zero.

I compiled the number of visits made to each candidate by examining the *Public Papers of the Presidents* archive for presidential remarks made while traveling during the six months before each Election Day.[ii] If the president made a remark that explicitly advocated for the election of a specific candidate while travelling in that candidate's state, then that member or that candidate's victorious opponent was considered to have received a visit.[iii] This method of classification yielded 42 visits made by President Clinton on behalf of 33 candidates in 1994 and 44 visits made by President Bush on behalf of 34 candidates in 2002. The number of visits received by any one member of the 104th Congress ranged from one to three and the number of visits received by any member of the 108th Congress ranged from one to two.

I defined a campaign visit as a remark made by the president in which he explicitly advocated for a specific candidate while traveling to that candidate's state in the six months before Election Day. This definition allowed for a consistent method of classifying visits given the numerous settings in which the presidents campaigned and the fact that there were numerous candidates mentioned by the presidents during these campaign stops. Restricting the definition of campaign visits to remarks made at events that were explicitly related to the midterm election, like fundraisers and rallies, was too narrow a method given President Bush's tendency to

advocate for candidates in more informal settings, such as outside of airports. Moreover, even if I had restricted the definition of visits to such events, I would still have needed a method for distinguishing remarks that advocated for a candidate's election from remarks that simply thanked a candidate for their presence since both types of remarks were made at fundraisers and rallies. Therefore, instead of looking at remarks made at explicitly election-related events, I looked at remarks made by the president that unambiguously advocated for a particular candidate's election at any type of event that took place when the president travelled.

One disadvantage of using this definition is that events during which the president expressed a desire to see a candidate elected in a few sentences are given the same weight as events during which the president focused entirely on one candidate or a small group of candidates. However, given the difficulties of consistently classifying visits based on remarks made in different settings and among non-endorsement mentions of other candidates, I believe that the method that I used was the best way to ensure that all candidate endorsements were included. I expect the coefficient for visits to be positive, which will indicate that visits increased a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences when time equaled zero.

There were a number of other variables included in the two data sets to help test my hypotheses. First, I included a time variable that was coded as the number of days after the first day of the Congress that each vote took place. There is also a margin of victory variable that was calculated by subtracting the percentage of the vote that each member's closest opponent received in the prior election from the percentage of the vote received by the member of Congress.[iv] I then constructed three interaction variables in order to account for different aspects of my hypotheses. The first interaction variable I created was timexvisits which was the result of

multiplying the value of time and the number of visits received by each member. This variable was used to test how the impact of a visit on a member's likelihood of voting in favor of the president's policy preference changed over the course of the term. I expect the coefficient to be negative for this variable if the indebtedness hypothesis is correct, according to which the impact of visits on voting in favor of the president's preferences should decrease throughout the term. I am not certain which direction the coefficient will be in if the incentivizing hypothesis is correct because this hypothesis posits that the impact of visits first decreases and then increases toward the end of the term. If the initial decrease is greater than the increase, then I expect the coefficient to be negative. If the secondary increase is greater than the initial decrease, I expect the coefficient for timexvisits to be positive. The opposition party hypothesis speculates that opposition party members whose opponents received visits will increase their support toward the end of the Congress. Therefore, I expect timexvisits to be positive when regressions are limited to opposition party members.

Next, I constructed marginxvisits to account for the conditional relationship between margin of victory, visits, and voting in support of the president's preferences. I expect that the coefficient will be negative because I hypothesize that the lower the margin of victory was for a member who received a visit or whose opponent received a visit, the more likely that member will be to vote in support of the president's preferences. The final interaction variable that I constructed was timexmargin, which I included in order to test the portion of the incentivizing hypothesis that claims that all of the president's co-partisans who won by smaller margins of victory will be more likely to vote in favor of the president's policy preferences toward the end of the term. Therefore, I expect that the coefficient of timexmargin will be positive if the incentivizing hypothesis is true.

Finally, there were a number of control variables included in the two data sets. The first control included was a dummy variable for party membership. I also included a presidential popularity variable as a control because of the preponderance of studies that focus on it as a causal factor of presidential legislative success. I used Gallup's presidential job approval rating from 5 days to three weeks before each vote to code the presidential popularity variable.[v] Another important control variable included in both data sets is each member's ideological distance from the president. I included the ideological distance variable in order to control for the probability that members of Congress who are ideologically similar to the president will vote in favor of his preferences simply because they share those preferences. This variable is coded using the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scale. Specifically, ideological distance from the president is operationalized as the difference between the president's score on the first dimension and each member's score on the same dimension.[vi] Members who switched parties during the Congress were omitted. The final control variable in the two data sets is whether or not a member of Congress retired from the House of Representatives after their term ended. It was necessary to account for retiring members because both the incentivizing hypothesis and the opposition party member hypothesis speculate that the relationship between visits and supporting votes is driven by a member's need to secure reelection. If either of these hypotheses are correct, then failing to account for retiring members may skew the results. This variable was coded 1 for members who retired from the House of Representatives and 0 for members who ran for reelection.[vii] Members who resigned or died during their term were omitted.

I used logistic regression because the dependent variable, voting in support of the president's preference, is dichotomous. I first ran logistic regressions for each Congress that

looked at the Congress as a whole. I also ran regressions that broke the results down by party in order to look at the relationship between visits and voting in support of the president's policy preferences for members of the president's party and for members of the opposition party. Standard errors were calculated with clustering by members. When timexvisits or marginxvisits were significant, I calculated the predicted probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences in order to quantify the impact of time and visits or margin and visits on supporting votes.

Results and Analysis

I began my data analysis with the 104th Congress. I first ran a logistic regression that examined the effect of visits, time, presidential popularity, margin of victory, ideological distance, retiring, Republicanism, timexvisits, marginxvisits, and timexmargin on voting in favor of the president's preferences for the Congress as a whole, which means that both Republicans and Democrats were included. The results from this regression are displayed in table one.

Table One
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences in the 104th Congress

	Vote for President's Preferences
Visits	0.549*
	(0.238)
Time	0.00100**
	(0.000377)
Presidential Popularity	0.159***
	(0.0102)
Margin of Victory	0.00515
	(0.00395)
Ideological Distance	2.348**
	(0.798)

Retiring	-0.141
	(0.126)
Republican	-0.506
	(0.633)
TimexVisits	-0.00131*
	(0.000607)
MarginxVisits	-0.00465
	(0.00403)
TimexMargin	-0.0000158
	(0.0000101)
Constant	-6.506***
	(0.498)
Observations	8471

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results from the first regression show that the impact of visits alone is significant at the .05 level for the 104th Congress overall. Although the coefficients are still in log-odds form, the fact that the visits coefficient is positive indicates that members of the 104th Congress were more likely to vote in support of the president's policy preferences when they or their opponent had received a campaign visit in the previous midterm election when time was equal to zero. Moreover, the interaction variable for time and visits is significant at the .05 level and the negative coefficient reflects the fact that the impact of visits decreases as time increases. I can therefore reject the null hypothesis for the 104th Congress. That timexvisits is negative does not necessarily indicate that the indebtedness hypothesis is correct because the coefficient can be negative if the incentivizing hypothesis is true and the initial decrease in support is greater than the secondary increase. However, the fact that timexmargin is insignificant strengthens the support for the indebtedness hypothesis because the alternative theory, the incentivizing hypothesis, posits that all of the president's co-partisans who won their seats by smaller margins

of victory will be more likely to vote in favor of the president's preferences as the next election approaches. Marginxvisits is not significant, though the coefficient is in the expected direction. This is surprising because I expected smaller margins of victory to increase the effect of visits on support in all of my hypotheses. The insignificance of marginxvisits does not suggest support for one hypothesis over another, but it does suggest that the perceived impact of a visit was not determined by a member's margin of victory in the 104th Congress as a whole.

Another result from this regression that is worth noting is that the Republican variable is not significant for the 104th Congress. This indicates that members of the 104th Congress were not influenced by their membership in the Democratic Party or in the Republican Party when voting on policies about which the president stated a preference. This insignificance is likely the result of the presence of the ideological distance control variable. In fact, when the ideological distance variable is removed from the regression, Republicanism becomes highly significant.

The initial regression of the 104th Congress indicates that the interaction between visits and time had an effect on voting in support of the president's policy preferences but because the coefficients are in log-odds form, it is impossible to examine the size of the impact of visits at each time. In order to understand the substantive significance of visits, I calculated the predicted probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences for each possible combination of time and visits while holding the other covariates at their means.[viii] Because they show the impact of visits at the time of each vote, the predicted probabilities should also indicate whether the indebtedness or the incentivizing hypothesis is correct. The predicted probabilities of voting for the president's preferences for the entire 104th Congress at the time of each vote are displayed in appendix one. Table two displays three of the important predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress.

Table Two
Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences in the 104th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
	22	0.486	0.614	0.728	0.818
		(.031)	(.054)	(.087)	(.098)
Time	437	0.589	0.583	0.577	0.571
		(.013)	(.029)	(.059)	(.09)
	636	0.636	0.568	0.497	0.426
		(.027)	(.054)	(.103)	(.151)

Standard errors in parentheses

Two general trends in the predicted probabilities are apparent. First, average members of the 104th Congress who did not receive visits or face opponents who received visits in the previous midterm election had higher probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences as time increased. This is consistent with the positive coefficient for the time variable in the regression for the 104th Congress, which indicated that when visits equaled zero, members were more likely to vote for the president's policy preferences as time increased. The second trend displayed in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress is that the impact of visits decreased over time, which supports the indebtedness hypothesis and undermines the incentivizing hypothesis. Another fact illuminated by the predicted probabilities is that at some point during the Congress the likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences for average members who did not receive visits surpassed the probability of voting in support of his preferences for members who did receive visits. After that time, the more visits an average member received, the lower their probability of voting in support of the president's preferences was.

Figure One



Figure Two



Figure Three



Figure Four



The predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress convey the substantive significance of visits at the time of each vote. As expected for the indebtedness hypothesis, the probability of voting in support of the president's preferences for average members who did not receive visits was lowest at the time of the first vote, which was on day 22 for the 104th Congress. Conversely, the impact of visits on an average member's probability of voting in support of the president for members who did receive visits is strongest at the earliest time. Members who did not receive visits had a 48.6% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences on day 22 while members who received one visit had a 61.4% probability of voting for the president's policy preference at the same time, which means that receiving one visit increased a member's probability of support by 12.8%. The probability of voting in support of the president's preferences on day 22 increased by 11.4% to 72.8% for members who received two visits and to 81.8% for members of Congress who received three visits, which was an increase of 9% from the probability of support with two votes.[ix] Clearly, visits had a substantive effect on a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences when the impact of visits was at its strongest.

The 437th day of the 104th Congress was the point in time at which the probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences with no visits surpassed the probability of supporting the president's policy preferences with one or more visits. Specifically, on the 437th day, the probability of voting for the president's preferences was 58.9% for an average member who had not received visits in the previous midterm campaign. The probability for members who received one visit was 58.3%; with two visits, the probability of support was 57.7%; and the probability of support for members who received three visits dropped to 57.1%.

By the day of the last vote, day 636, the gap between the probability of support for

members with no visits and those with one, two, and three visits had further widened. At that time, members who had not received visits had a 63.6% probability of voting for the president's preferences. Members who received one visit had a 56.8% probability of voting in accordance with the president's preference, members with two visits had a 49.7% probability of support, and members with three visits had only a 42.6% probability of voting for the president's preferences. The total increase in the probability of voting in support of the president from day 22 to day 636 for members who did not receive visits was 15%. The total decrease in probability was 4.6% for members with one visit, 23.1% for members with two visits, and 39.2% for members who received three visits during the previous campaign.

Figure Five



The decrease in the impact of visits and the fact that the probability of support with no visits surpassed the probability of support with one or more visits indicates that there was a tradeoff between support at the beginning of the term and support at the end of the term for President Clinton. Visits clearly increased the likelihood that an average member would support

his policy positions toward the beginning of the Congress, but they also resulted in the probability of support with visits being substantially lower than the probability with no visits toward the end of the term, particularly for members who received multiple visits. The tradeoff for President Clinton, then, was between support levels that were higher than they would otherwise have been at the beginning of the Congress and support levels that were lower than they would otherwise have been after the 437th day of Congress. The relatively small decrease over time in the probability of support with one visit may present a good solution to this tradeoff if the same pattern is displayed in the 108th Congress. The effect of one visit is smaller than the effect of multiple visits at the beginning of the Congress, but the gap between the probability of support with zero visits and with one visit is much smaller than the gap between zero visits and multiple visits at the end of the term.

The existence of this tradeoff does not change the fact that the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress support the indebtedness hypothesis. Members of the 104th Congress who received campaign visits from the president during the 1994 midterms were more likely to vote in favor of the president's policy preferences at the beginning of their terms and this support decreased over time. Eventually, the probability of voting for the president's preferences for members who did not receive visits surpassed the probability for members who did receive campaign visits. The timing of the support indicates that indebtedness hypothesis is correct and therefore implies that visits and supporting votes are linked through the fact that members believe that the president's visit helped them win their seats.

Although the analysis of the 104th Congress as a whole suggests that the indebtedness hypothesis is correct, there is a possibility that looking at the results for Democrats and Republicans together is masking other significant relationships. Another possibility is that the

relationships that are significant for the 104th Congress are stronger or weaker when the regression is limited to a single party. Therefore, I also examined the impact of the independent variables on voting in favor of the president's policy preferences for Democrats and Republicans in the 104th Congress. The results for Democrats in the 104th Congress are displayed in table three.

Table Three
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences for Democrats in the 104th Congress

	Vote for President's Preferences
Visits	0.607**
	(0.205)
Time	0.00119*
	(0.000588)
Presidential Popularity	0.0285*
	(0.0139)
Margin of Victory	0.0121
	(0.00629)
Ideological Distance	5.055***
	(0.338)
Retiring	-0.177
	(0.114)
TimexVisits	-0.00146**
	(0.000504)
MarginxVisits	-0.00929*
	(0.00468)
TimexMargin	-0.0000549***
	(0.0000159)
Constant	0.597
	(0.623)
Observations	4024

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

First, when the regression is limited to the president's co-partisans in the 104th Congress, visits and timexvisits are statistically significant at the .01 level and are thus more strongly significant for Democrats in the 104th Congress than they were for the Congress as a whole. Additionally, both coefficients are in the expected direction. Visits has a positive relationship with voting in favor of the president's policy preferences, which means that Democrats who received visits were more likely to support the president's policy preferences when time equaled zero. Timexvisits has a negative coefficient, which means that the impact of visits decreased over time. This does not necessarily support the indebtedness hypothesis over the incentivizing hypothesis, but because the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole indicated support for indebtedness, I suspect that the negative coefficient on timexvisits refers to an overall decrease in the impact of visits over time, not an initial decrease that was larger than a secondary increase. Calculating the predicted probabilities of support for Democrats in the 104th Congress will either confirm or deny this supposition.

Although the margin variable is not significant by itself, the two interaction variables that involve the margin of victory, marginxvisits and timexmargin, are statistically significant when the regression is limited to Democrats in the 104th Congress. The marginxvisits variable is significant at the .05 level and has a negative coefficient, which means that the impact of visits decreased as margins of victory increased for the president's co-partisans. Both the indebtedness hypothesis and the incentivizing hypothesis posit that members of the president's party are more likely to vote in favor of the president's preferences when they won their seats by smaller margins of victory, so by itself, the marginxvisits variable does not suggest which hypothesis is correct. The fact that the marginxvisits variable is significant and in the expected direction does

indicate that the impact of visits was dependent on smaller margins of victory. This supports the idea that the president's co-partisans were more likely to perceive the president's visit as partially responsible for their victory when they won close elections.

The timexmargin variable is strongly significant for Democrats in the 104th Congress. I expected that the interaction between time and margin of victory would be significant if the incentivizing hypothesis was true; all members of the president's party who won their seats by smaller margins would be more likely to vote in support of the president's policy preferences toward the end of their terms because they would want to incentivize a campaign visit from the president in the upcoming election. Therefore, I expected that if the incentivizing hypothesis were true then the timexmargin variable would have a positive coefficient, which would indicate that the impact of a member's margin of victory on voting in support of the president's preferences increased over time. However, the interaction variable for time and margin is negative in the regression for the Democrats in the 104th Congress, which means that the impact of a member's margin of victory on support for the president's policy preferences decreased over time. This unexpected directionality means that the significance of the timexmargin variable does not increase support for the incentivizing hypothesis or weaken the support for the indebtedness hypothesis. I am not certain how to explain the negative relationship between timexmargin and voting in favor of the president's preferences.

In order to understand the substantive significance of visits for Democrats in the 104th Congress and to determine which hypothesis is supported, I calculated the predicted probability of voting in support of the president's preferences for average Democrats for each combination of time and visits. The complete table of predicted probabilities is contained in appendix two. Table four displays the predicted probability of voting in support of the president's policy

preferences for Democrats in the 104th Congress on three of the most important days of the 104th Congress.

Table Four
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President's Policy Preferences for Democrats in the 104th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
	22	0.743	0.837	0.901	0.942
		(.035)	(.034)	(.036)	(.032)
Time	437	0.825	0.821	0.816	0.812
		(.012)	(.023)	(.044)	(.067)
	636	0.857	0.813	0.759	0.695
		(.023)	(.04)	(.081)	(.136)

Standard errors in parentheses

The patterns in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole are also present when the probabilities are broken down for Democrats. Members who did not receive visits from President Clinton during the previous midterm election had an increased probability of voting for his preferences as time progressed. Alternatively, members who received one or more campaign visit had a higher probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences at the beginning of the Congress, but this probability decreased over time. Therefore, the results for Democrats in the 104th Congress support the indebtedness hypothesis.

Figure Six



Figure Seven



Figure Eight



Figure Nine



The predicted probabilities were higher for all Democrats in the 104th Congress than they were for the overall Congress, which is most likely a reflection of the fact that the distance between President Clinton's ideology and the mean ideology of his co-partisans was smaller than the distance between President Clinton's ideology and the mean ideology of the Congress as a whole. On the day of the first vote included in the data, day 22, Democrats who did not receive a visit in the previous campaign had a 74.3% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences. This probability increased to 83.7% when an average Democrat received one campaign visit from the president and to 90.1% when visits were increased to two. Finally, average Democrats in the 104th Congress had a 94.2% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences on day 22 when they received three visits. Therefore, when the probability of supporting the president's preferences was at its lowest for Democrats who did not receive campaign visits and at its highest for those who did, moving from zero visits to one visit resulted in a 9.4% increase in probability; an increase from one visit to two visits led to a 6.4% increase in probability; and an increase from two to three visits caused a 4.1% increase in the probability of an average Democrat voting in support of the president's preferences.

Just as it did for the 104th Congress as a whole, the probability of supporting the president's policy preferences for an average Democrat who did not receive campaign visits surpassed the probability for those who did on the 437th day of the Congress. At that point in time, Democrats who did not receive visits had an 82.5% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences. The president's co-partisans with one visit had an 82.1% probability of support, those with two visits had a probability of 81.6%, and those who received three visits had an 81.2% probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences. The differences

in the probability of voting for the president's preferences with zero visits, one visit, two visits, and three visits continued to grow until the end of the Congress.

By the time of the last vote included in the data for the 104th Congress, which was on day 636, an average Democrat who did not receive a campaign visit had an 85.7% probability of voting for the president's preferences. As such, Democrats who did not receive campaign visits had a total increase of 11.4% in their probability of support over the course of the Congress. Conversely, Democrats with one visit had a probability of 81.3% on day 636 and had a 2.4% total decrease in their probability of voting in support of the president's preferences over the 104th Congress. Democrats who received two visits had a 75.9% predicted probability of voting for the president's favored policies and a had total decrease in probability of 14.2%. Finally, average Democrats who received three visits had a probability of support of 69.5%, which was a total drop of 24.7% over the course of the Congress.

Figure Ten



The predicted probabilities for Democrats in the 104th Congress mirror those of the 104th Congress as a whole, although Democrats had higher probabilities of supporting the president's desired policies overall. The tradeoff between higher support at the beginning of the Congress and lower support at the end of the Congress is displayed in the results for Democrats in the 104th Congress, as is the fact that the probability of support with one visit had a much smaller decline over the term than did the probability of support with multiple visits. Additionally, the fact that campaign visits increased the probability that Democrats would vote in support of the president's preferences toward the beginning of the term and that this support faded over time describes the timing of increased support that is posited in the indebtedness hypothesis. Therefore, the predicted probabilities for the president's co-partisans in the 104th Congress add support for the indebtedness hypothesis.

Finally, limiting the regression to Republicans in the 104th Congress revealed no statistical significance for visits or for any of the interaction variables. The results from this initial regression are displayed in the first column of table five. The lack of significance suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis for members of the opposition party. However, it is still possible that members of the opposition party who won their seats by a small margin of victory were more likely to vote in favor of the president's policy preferences but that this relationship is suppressed in the results displayed in column one of table five. As such, I ran a regression limited to members of the Republican Party who won their seats by a margin of victory of less than 10%. The results from this regression are displayed in column two of table five.

Table Five
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences for Republicans in the 104th Congress

	(1) Republicans	(2) Republicans with Margin<10

Visits	0.152	1.268*
	(0.427)	(0.614)
Time	0.00126**	0.000910
	(0.000433)	(0.00112)
Presidential Popularity	0.314***	0.335***
	(0.0150)	(0.0376)
Margin of Victory	0.00505	-0.0532
	(0.00434)	(0.0843)
Ideological Distance	1.609*	1.529**
	(0.761)	(0.511)
Retiring	0.0912	0.203
	(0.174)	(0.121)
TimexVisits	-0.000158	-0.000483
	(0.000700)	(0.000968)
MarginxVisits	0.00569	-0.168*
	(0.00887)	(0.0803)
TimexMargin	-0.0000120	0.0000589
	(0.00000927)	(0.000190)
Constant	-15.98***	-16.93***
	(0.968)	(1.823)
Observations	4447	896

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Limiting the analysis to Republican members of the 104th Congress who won their seats by a margin of less than 10% shows that visits are statistically significant at the .05 level. The positive coefficient means that Republicans whose opponents received campaign visits from President Clinton and who won their districts by a margin of less than 10% were more likely to vote in favor of the president's policy preferences when time was equal to zero. The interaction variable for margin and visits is also significant for House Republicans with margins of less than 10% in the expected direction. The negative coefficient reflects the fact that the effect of visits

on voting in favor of the president's preferences increased as margins of victory decreased. Neither of the interaction variables featuring time are significant for this cohort. I expected Republicans whose opponents received visits and who won by small margins of victory to be more likely to support the president's preferences toward the end of their terms but the fact that timexvisits is insignificant indicates that Republicans who won their seats by a margin of less than 10% and whose opponents received visits had probabilities of support that did not vary over time.

The results of the regression for House Republicans with margins of less than 10% suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that the hypothesis about members of the opposition party can be partially accepted. The portion of the hypothesis that posits that members of the opposition party who won their districts by smaller margins of victory and whose opponents received at least one campaign visit from the president are more likely to vote in support of the president's preferences can be accepted. However, this hypothesis also speculates that members of the opposition party who won their seats by a smaller margin and whose opponents received visits will be more likely to vote in favor of the president's policy preferences toward the end of their term. This portion of the opposition party member hypothesis must be rejected because timexvisits is insignificant.

The coefficients reported in table five are in log-odds form and are not indicative of the substantive significance of campaign visits for the likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences for Republicans in the 104th Congress who won their seats by margins of less than 10%. In order to quantify the impact of visits for such Republicans, I calculated the predicted probability of voting in support of the president's preferences with every possible combination of visits and margin of victory from .5 to 10 in increments of .5. All other covariates

were held at their means. The predicted probabilities for all combinations of margin of victory (up to 10%) and visits are displayed in appendix three. The predicted probabilities of voting for the president's preferred policies with a margin of victory of .5% and 10% are reported in table six. This table also displays the predicted probabilities of voting for the president's preferences with a margin of victory of 8%, which was the margin at which the predicted probability with zero visits surpassed the predicted probability with one, two, or three visits.

Table Six
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President's Preferences for Republicans in the 104th Congress with Margins of Victory of Less Than 10%

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
	0.5	0.266	0.542	0.795	0.927
		(.07)	(.16)	(.193)	(.119)
Margin	8	0.2	0.184	0.172	0.161
		(.05)	(.066)	(.121)	(.175)
	10	0.18	0.126	0.087	0.059
		(.07)	(.067)	(.084)	(.088)

Standard errors in parentheses

One difference in the pattern of the predicted probabilities for Republicans with a margin of victory of less than 10% is that the probability of voting in support of the president's preferences decreased as margins increased for every value of visits. Conversely, predicted probabilities increased over time when visits equaled zero for Democrats and the 104th Congress as a whole. Nonetheless, the predicted probability of voting for the president's desired policies with zero visits did surpass the predicted probability of voting in support of the president when visits equaled one, two, or three. This first occurred when an average Republican had a margin of victory of 8%. Additionally, the impact of visits was highest when a Republican had a margin of victory of .5% and this impact decreased as the margin of victory increased.

Figure Eleven



Figure Twelve



Figure Thirteen



Figure Fourteen



Republicans with the smallest margins of victory had higher probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences and those who won against opponents who received visits in the previous election had the highest probability of voting in support of the president among those with small margins. Republican members of the 104th Congress with a margin of victory of .5% had a 26.6% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences when their opponents did not receive campaign visits in the previous election. This probability increased by 27.6% to a 54.2% probability for members whose opponents received one visit in the 1994 midterm and by 25.3% to a 79.5% probability for members whose opponents received two visits. Finally, Republicans who won with a margin of .5% against opponents with three visits had a 92.7% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences, an increase of 13.2% from the probability with two visits. However, the stronger probabilities of support with smaller margins deteriorated rather quickly as margins of victory increased, and when the margin of victory increased to 8%, Republicans had a slightly higher probability of voting in support of the president's preferences when their previous opponent did not receive visits.

The gap between probabilities when visits equaled zero and when visits equaled one, two, or three increased as margins increased from 8%. The probability of voting in favor of the president's preferred policies was 18% for Republican members who won their seats by a 10% margin of victory and whose opponents did not receive visits. This probability dropped by a total of 8.6% from a margin of .5% to a margin of 10%. Members who won their seats by 10% and whose previous opponent received one visit had a 12.6% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences. Therefore the impact of one visit on a Republican's probability of voting for the president's desired policies decreased by a total of 41.6% from a margin of victory of .5% to a margin of 10%. The likelihood of supporting the president's preferences for Republicans

who won their seats by a 10% margin and who faced an opponent who received two visits was 8.7%, a total drop of 70.8% from a margin of .5%. Finally, average Republicans who won their seats by 10% and whose opponents received three visits during the previous campaign had a 5.9% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences. Therefore, the impact of three visits dropped by 86.6% from a margin of .5% to a margin of 10%.

Although the predicted probabilities for Republicans who won their seats by a margin of less than 10% vary over margin of victory, not time, a similar tradeoff is displayed with both probabilities. Visits significantly increased the probability of support for Republicans who won their seats by very small margins, but the impact decreased rapidly as margins increased. When the impact of visits vary across margins, one visit is not an attractive solution to the problem of the tradeoff as it is when the impact of visits varied over time because the probability of support with one visit has a much larger total decrease over margin than it does over time.

Figure Fifteen



Even with this tradeoff, the predicted probabilities for Republicans in the 104th Congress who won their seats by margins of less than 10% support the opposition party member hypothesis. These probabilities clearly illustrate that visits had a substantive effect on an opposition party member's probability of voting in support of the president's preferences when that member won their seat by a very small margin of victory. The probabilities also reflect the fact that the impact of visits decreased as an opposition party member's margin of victory increased.

Therefore, the results from the 104th Congress lead me to reject the null hypothesis and the incentivizing hypothesis. These regressions and probabilities also lead me to accept the indebtedness hypothesis and accept the opposition party member hypothesis, excluding the aspect that deals with the timing of opposition member support. However, the previous regressions only allowed me to accept these hypotheses for the 104th Congress. In order to account for differences across Congresses, I ran regressions on the same variables for the 108th Congress.

First, I ran a regression on the 108th Congress as a whole. The results for this regression are displayed in table seven. These results mirror those from the 104th Congress in two important ways. First, the visits coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level for the 108th Congress. This means that when time equaled zero, a member who received visits or whose opponent received visits during the campaign was more likely to vote in support of the president's policy preferences. Second, the interaction variable for time and visits is significant at the .05 level and in the expected direction. Like members of the 104th Congress, then, members of the 108th Congress were more likely to vote in favor of the president's preferences when they or their campaign opponent received a campaign visit and the impact of visits declined as time

progressed. Again, this does not necessarily support the indebtedness hypothesis over the incentivizing hypothesis. If the impact of visits initially decreased and then increased but the decrease was larger than the subsequent increase, the negative coefficient may indicate support for the incentivizing hypothesis. The predicted probabilities for the 108th Congress will confirm which hypothesis is supported by the negative coefficient on timexvisits.

Table Seven
Log-Odds of Voting for the President's Preferences in the 108th Congress

	Vote for President's Preferences
Visits	0.541*
	(0.272)
Time	0.00219***
	(0.000565)
Presidential Popularity	0.0209***
	(0.00496)
Margin of Victory	0.0109*
	(0.00453)
Ideological Distance	-2.056***
	(0.278)
Retiring	0.125
	(0.0997)
Republican	0.940***
	(0.249)
TimexVisits	-0.00149*
	(0.000623)
MarginxVisits	0.00865
	(0.0101)
TimexMargin	-0.0000315**
	(0.0000109)
Constant	-0.784

	(0.572)
Observations	4863

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Two additional results from the regression for the 108th Congress are worth noting. First, the interaction variable for time and margin of victory is significant at the .01 level but the relationship is in the unexpected direction like it was for Democrats in the 104th Congress. The coefficient suggests that the impact of a member's margin of victory on voting in support of the president's policy preferences decreased as the term progressed. Again, I do not have an explanation for the unexpected negative relationship between timexmargin and support for the president's policy preferences. The second interesting result is that both ideological distance from the president and Republicanism were significantly related to voting for the president's preferences in the 108th Congress. The regression for the 104th Congress as a whole displayed a strongly significant relationship between ideological distance from the president and support, but there was no significant relationship between Republicanism and support until ideological distance was removed from the regression. In the 108th Congress, however, Republicanism is positively and significantly related to support independently of ideological distance from the president. This suggests that there was something different about party identification and support for the president in the 108th Congress than there was in the 104th Congress. The fact that ideological distance from the president captured the entire effect of party on support in the 104th Congress indicates that the importance of party did not extend beyond a shared ideology, at least insofar as support for the president's policy preferences was concerned. That party membership was significant when the effect of ideology was controlled for in the 108th Congress implies that the parties themselves had some influence on their members' decisions to vote in support of the president's preferences or against the president's preferences. It is unclear what the mechanism

of this influence was and why it was not a factor in the 104th Congress, but the result itself is rather interesting.

In order to quantify the relationship between visits, time, and support for the president's policy preferences and to clarify which hypothesis is supported, I calculated the predicted probability of voting in favor of the president's policy preferences for each possible value of time, visits, and timexvisits for the 108th Congress. The predicted probability for each combination is reported in appendix four. Three of the more important predicted probabilities are reported in table eight.

Table Eight
Predicted Probability of Voting for the President's Preferences in the 108th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2
Time	136	0.396	0.479	0.563
		(.033)	(.049)	(.092)
	452	0.567	0.534	0.501
		(.014)	(.028)	(.059)
	633	0.66	0.565	0.465
		(.034)	(.046)	(.087)

Standard errors in parentheses

The predicted probabilities for the 108th Congress as a whole are puzzling given the patterns of previous probabilities and in light of the negative coefficient for timexvisits in the regression results for the 108th Congress. As expected, when average members of the 108th Congress did not receive a visit or did not face an opponent who received a visit, their predicted probability of voting in support of the president's preferences increased over time. The fact that members who received two visits or faced opponents who received two visits were more likely to vote in support of the president's preferences at the beginning of the Congress and this support decreased over time is also consistent with expectations. However, members who received one

visit or who faced opponents who received one visit were more likely to vote for the president's preferences as time increased. This pattern of support does not fit either the indebtedness or the incentivizing hypothesis. Moreover, it does not make sense that the impact of one visit increased over time while the impact of two visits decreased over time. It is possible that these unexpected probabilities are a result of the fact that the data for the 108th Congress does not include any votes from before the 136th day of the term. The results from the 104th Congress reflected the fact that the impact of visits on a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president was strongest at the beginning of the term. Given the fact that there were no key roll call votes on domestic or economic policies on which the president took a position until the 136th day of the 108th Congress, it is possible that much of the effect of visits was not captured and the results are skewed.

Figure Sixteen



Figure Seventeen



Figure Eighteen



That said, there were some expected patterns in the results. Again, the probability of voting for the president's preferences when visits equaled zero and when visits equaled two changed in the expected directions over time. Moreover, the predicted probability when visits equaled zero surpassed the predicted probability of voting in support of the president's preferences when visits equaled one or two, which is consistent with the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress.

On the day of the first vote, day 136, average members of the 108th Congress who did not receive a visit or face an opponent who received a visit had a 39.6% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences. This probability increased by 8.3% for members who received one visit and who had a 47.9% probability of voting in support of the president. Members of the 108th Congress who received two visits had an 8.4% increase in their probability of supporting the president's position. These members had a 56.3% probability of voting in support of the president's preferences on day 136.

The point in time at which the probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences with zero visits surpassed the probability of doing the same with one or two visits was between day 319 and day 452 for the 108th Congress. By the 452nd day, members who did not receive visits had a 56.7% likelihood of voting for the president's policy preferences, while members who received one visit had a 53.4% probability of doing so and members who received two visits had a 50.1% probability of casting a supporting vote. As in the 104th Congress, the gap between the probability of supporting the president with zero visits and with one and two visits continued to increase. By the time of the last vote, day 633, members of the 108th Congress who did not receive visits had a 66% probability of voting for the president's preferences and had a 26.4% total increase in probability over the course of the Congress. Members who received one

visit had a 56.5% probability of voting in support of the president and had an 8.6% total increase in probability from day 136 to day 633. Finally, members of the 108th Congress who received two visits from President Bush in the 2002 midterm campaign had a 46.5% probability of voting in favor of his preferences on day 633. These members had a 9.8% total decrease in their probability of voting in line with the president's preferences over the course of the Congress.

The predicted probabillities for the 108th Congress complicate the the results of this study because they do not conform to the indebtedness hypothesis or the incentivizing hypothesis. If they supported the indebtedness hypothesis, members of Congress who received visits would have had higher levels of support at the beginning of the Congress and this support would have decreased over time. The indebtedness hypothesis describes the support levels of members who received two visits, but it does not describe the way in which members of the 108th Congress who received one visit increasingly supported the president's preferences over time. The incentivizing hypothesis is not supported by the predicted probabilities for members who received one visit as this hypothesis posits that members who received visits will have higher levels of support toward the beginning and toward the end of the Congress. The predicted probabilities for members who received one visit show a general increase in support over time, not high levels of support dropping and then increasing again over time. Therefore, the predicted probabilities for the 108th Congress do not support either of the hypotheses that I expected to explain the impact of visits on voting in support of the president's preferences.

Figure Nineteen



Despite the fact that the probabilities do not support either of the hypotheses in this study, visits clearly had an effect on a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences and I therefore cannot accept the null hypothesis. Again, the fact that no key roll call votes on domestic and economic policies on which the president took a position occurred prior to day 136 in the 108th Congress means that the data may be skewed and it is possible that the relationship between time, visits, and votes would be clarified if there was data for the period of time before day 136. It may also be possible that breaking the results down for Democrats and Republicans could clarify this relationship.

Running regressions for Democrats in the 108th Congress and for Republicans in the 108th Congress unexpectedly failed to reveal a relationship between visits, time, and votes for the president's preferences. The regressions for both parties are displayed in table nine. That neither visits nor the interaction variable for time and visits are significant is surpring because of the fact

that both of the variables were statistically significant for the 108th Congress overall and it is unclear where that significance was generated. Limiting the regressions to members with smaller margins of victory does not reveal any significant relationship between visits, time, and voting in favor of the president's preferences or between visits, margin of victory, and voting in support of the president's desired policies. The fact that the data for the 108th Congress starts with the 136th day may again be to blame for the odd results displayed in table nine. If the impact of visits is indeed greatest toward the beginning of a term, as it was in the 104th Congress, it may be that too much of the effect of visits remains unaccounted for when the first vote considered in the data took place well after the 108th Congress began.

Table Nine
Log-Odds of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences in the 108th Congress by Party

	Republicans	Democrats
Visits	0.0352	-0.691
	(0.266)	(0.859)
Time	-0.00311***	0.00590***
	(0.000502)	(0.000856)
Presidential Popularity	0.00672	0.0393**
	(0.00653)	(0.0125)
Margin of Victory	-0.00188	-0.0115
	(0.00564)	(0.0118)
Ideological Distance	-1.560***	-3.681***
	(0.383)	(0.317)
Retiring	0.0941	0.0105
	(0.138)	(0.142)
TimexVisits	0.0000871	0.000974
	(0.000464)	(0.00151)
MarginxVisits	0.00977	-0.0109
	(0.0126)	(0.0118)

TimexMargin	0.00000832	0.0000182
	(0.00000984)	(0.0000216)
Constant	2.715***	-1.293
	(0.521)	(1.025)
Observations	2755	2108

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the impact of visits over time and over margin of victory on a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences in the 108th Congress because the regression results and predicted probabilities for this Congress are inconsistent. An initial regression on the 108th Congress as a whole supports the indebtedness hypothesis because the statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction variable for time and visits means that campaign visits increased a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president's preferences and that the impact of visits decreased over time. The predicted probabilities for average members in the 108th Congress partially confirm this relationship. When members received two visits in the previous midterm campaign, they were more likely to vote in support of the president's preferences than those who did not receive visits and this support decreased over time. However, while members who received one visit were more likely to vote in support of the president's preferences than those who did not at the beginning of the Congress, this support increased over time. This does not support the indebtedness hypothesis or the incentivizing hypothesis. Additionally, running regressions for each party revealed no statistically significant relationship for time, visits, and voting for the president's preferences or margin, visits, and voting in support of his desired policies. To the extent that I can draw conclusions from these mixed results, I must accept the null hypothesis for opposition party members and reject the indebtedness hypothesis, but I do so with considerable caution.

The fact that visits had the greatest effect on a member's likelihood of voting in support

of the president's preferences at the earliest date in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress and for members who received two visits in the 108th Congress overall leads me to suspect that the data for the 108th Congress does not accurately reflect the relationships between visits, time, and votes and visits, margin of victory and votes. The first key vote on a domestic or economic policy on which the president took a position in the 108th Congress was not until the 136th day of the Congress, which means that most of the beginning of the Congress is simply not included in the data set. If the impact of visits was highest during that period, as it was in the 104th Congress, not having any votes that occurred before the 136th day of Congress may mean that much of the effect of visits is simply not captured in the data. Therefore, the lack of votes from the first 135 days of the 108th Congress may be the cause of the mixed results in the predicted probabilities and of the lack of significance for the interaction variables for visits and time and visits and margin of victory in the regressions for Democrats and Republicans in the 108th Congress.

Fortunately, the results from the 104th Congress are much clearer than those from the 108th Congress. The results from the regression and the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress overall support the indebtedness hypothesis, which states that visits have an impact on a member's likelihood of voting in support of the president and this support decreases over time. The statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction variable for time and visits in the regression for the 104th Congress reflects this decreasing impact of visits over time. This decrease is also reflected in the predicted probabilities for the 104th Congress as a whole, which also quantify the impact of visits. At their greatest impact, on day 22, increasing visits from zero to one increases an average member's probability of voting in support of the president's preferences by 12.8%, two visits increases this probability by 11.4%, and three visits increases it

by 9%. The results for Democrats in the 104th Congress display the same statistically significant negative coefficient for time and visits and the predicted probabilities also reflect the decreasing impact of visits over time and both therefore support the indebtedness hypothesis. When visits had the greatest impact, on day 22, one visit increased an average Democrat's probability of voting in support of the president by 9.4%, two visits increased the probability of voting in support of his preferences by 6.4%, and three visits increased this probability by 4.1%.

Finally, the results of the regression and the predicted probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences for Republicans who won their seats by margins of less than 10% partially support the opposition party hypothesis, which posits that members of the opposition party will be more likely to support the president's preferences when they won their districts by smaller margins of victory and that this support will be greatest toward the end of the Congress. The regression for this cohort did not show a significant relationship between time and visits, so the aspect of the opposition party hypothesis that specifies the timing of the support ought to be rejected. The regression for such Republicans revealed a statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction variable for margin of victory and visits, which indicated that members with smaller margins of victory were more likely to vote for the president's preferences when their opponents received visits and this impact decreased as margins increased.

The predicted probabilities for this cohort also support the hypothesis that the impact of visits decreases as margins increase and quantified the impact of visits. This impact was greatest with a margin of victory of .5%. Average Republicans in the 104th Congress who won by .5% had a 27.6% increase in their probability of voting in support of the president's preferences when visits increased from zero to one. Members of this cohort whose opponents received two visits had a 25.3% increase in probability and members whose opponents received three visits had a

13.2% increase in their probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences.

Therefore, I can accept the indebtedness hypothesis and the opposition party member hypothesis excluding the portion of the hypothesis that deals with the timing of opposition member support. When members of the 104th Congress received campaign visits, they were more likely to vote in support of the president's policy preferences. This support was greatest at the beginning of the term and decreased over time. Members of the Republican Party who won their seats by a margin of less than 10% against an opponent who received visits were more likely to support the president's preferences when they had margins of victory of less than 8%. The impact of visits was greatest at the lowest margin of victory and decreased significantly as margins increased to 10%.

Conclusion

This study began as an attempt to push for more innovation in the study of presidential legislative success. Scholars of presidential legislative success consistently debate the same causal factors, like presidential popularity and presidential skill, and rarely examine the effect of other factors. The fact that I found a statistically and substantively significant relationship between campaign visits to congressional candidates and support for the president's preferences in the 104th Congress is an indication that scholars would benefit from analyzing new causal factors rather than treating the field of presidential legislative success as if the only thing left to be determined is the size of the effect of the typically studied factors.

The results of this study are also of practical importance to political pundits and to presidential administrations. When pundits understand that presidents can use campaign visits to increase the support for their policy preferences, they are better able to analyze or even predict presidential travel during midterm elections. More importantly, however, is the way in which

presidential administrations can use the knowledge of the relationship between visits and support to plan legislative strategy. One of the reasons that I chose to examine campaign visits as a causal factor of support for the president's preferences was that a significant relationship between the two would give presidents a tool that they could use to proactively improve the likelihood of support from members of Congress. Many of the typically studied causal factors of legislative success, like partisan composition of Congress and presidential popularity, cannot be easily used to increase the president's likelihood of success. For example, knowing that the opposition party has a large majority in the Congress only helps the president increase the probability that his policy preferences will be passed insofar as he is aware of the fact that members of the opposition probably will not support a given policy and he should wait for a more favorable reconfiguration of Congress to promote a given policy. The advantage of campaign visits as a causal factor of support for the president's policy preferences is that the president can use them to improve the probability of support without a large expenditure of resources.

The results from the 104th Congress in this study provide a guide as to how presidents can best use campaign visits to increase the probability of support from different members of Congress. There are two types of potential members that presidents can target with campaign visits. First, presidents can target potential opposition party members by visiting candidates who are in extremely close races in which the opposition candidate may win by a very small margin of victory. Opposition party members are less likely to vote in support of the president's preferences without visits than members of the president's party, so using visits to increase the probability of support from opposition candidates may increase the probability of support the most. Indeed, the predicted probabilities for Republicans with margins of less than 10% in the

104th Congress show that opposition party members who won their seats by very small margins of victory against candidates who received visits had a much greater probability of voting in support of the president's preferences than those who did not face such an opponent. Another advantage of targeting opposition party members is that, unlike those of the president's co-partisans, their probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences do not change over time. Therefore, the probability of voting in support of the president's policy preferences for members of the opposition party members will be sustained throughout the Congress.

However, the predicted probabilities of the 104th Congress also show some of the disadvantages of using campaign visits to target potential opposition members. First, the margins of victory at which campaign visits increase the probability of support to over 50% are very small. In the 104th Congress, for example, members of the opposition party who won their seats by a margin of between 5.5% and 7.5% and whose opponents received campaign visits had higher probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences than those whose opponents did not receive visits, but neither type of opposition party member had a probability of support over 50%. Second, the impact of visits on a member's support is dependent on that member having a very small margin of victory and there is simply no way that a president or his advisors can accurately predict margins of victory. Because the range of margins at which visits substantively increase a member's probability of voting in support of the president's preferences is so small, there is a considerable risk of wasting resources on targeting opposition members who end up winning by margins of victory that fall outside of the substantive range. Presidents would, therefore, best use their resources by targeting potential members from their own party rather than potential opposition party members.

The predicted probabilities from the 104th Congress provide guidance as to how

presidents can best target members of their own party. The disadvantage of targeting potential co-partisans with campaign visits is that the impact of such visits decreases over time and is therefore inevitably unsustainable. Moreover, at some point between the 400th and 500th day of Congress, the probability of voting in support of the president's preferences for co-partisans who did not receive visits will be greater than the probability of doing the same for members who did receive visits. However, the fact that the impact of visits is dependent on time is also an advantage because, unlike when visits are dependent on margin of victory, there is no possibility of wasting resources on visiting potential members of Congress who will not end up with increased probabilities of support. Furthermore, the gap between the probability of support for members with zero visits and members with one visits after the point between 400 and 500 days is rather small. The president's co-partisans who received one visit have a higher probability of voting in support of the president's preferences than those with zero visits at the beginning of the Congress and only a slightly smaller probability of support once probabilities with zero visits surpass those with one visit. Therefore, the best strategy that presidents can pursue when using campaign visits to increase the probability of support for their policy preferences is to target potential members of their own party with one visit.

This recommendation is based only on the results for the 104th Congress because of the mixed results that were obtained in the analysis of the 108th Congress. If the relationships between visits, time, and support and visits, margin, and support were clarified for the 108th Congress, the implications of this study could possibly change. Therefore, future research ought to begin by expanding the data for the 108th Congress by including other types of votes, such as foreign policy votes. Similarly, future research can expand on this study by examining the effect of visits in different Congresses, which may also make my results more generalizable if future

scholars increase the variation in contextual factors, such as the size of the majority in Congress, that may influence a member's likelihood of supporting the president. Another avenue for future research is the effect of campaign visits on support after presidential election years, not midterm elections. The honeymoon effect may overlap with the increased support levels at the beginning of Congresses and therefore the impact of visits may change after presidential elections. Finally, future studies may wish to examine the impact of visits by party notables on support for the president's preferences. The president is not the only party figure that campaigns for candidates and visits from party notables representing the president's administration, like first ladies and vice presidents, may also impact a member's likelihood of supporting the president's policy preferences. In sum, very little is known about the effect of campaign visits on support for the president's preferences because there has been little discussion of it as a causal factor of support by scholars. As such, the avenues for future research on the effect of campaign visits are numerous.

Appendix One

Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences in the 104th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
Time	22	0.486	0.614	0.728	0.818
		(.031)	(.054)	(.087)	(.098)
	63	0.496	0.61	0.714	0.799
		(.027)	(.049)	(.08)	(.095)
	84	0.502	0.609	0.707	0.789
		(.026)	(.046)	(.077)	(.094)
	96	0.505	0.609	0.703	0.784
		(.025)	(.044)	(.076)	(.093)
	137	0.515	0.605	0.689	0.762
		(.021)	(.039)	(.069)	(.089)
	210	0.533	0.6	0.663	0.721
		(.015)	(.032)	(.059)	(.081)
	215	0.534	0.6	0.662	0.719
		(.015)	(.031)	(.059)	(.081)
	291	0.553	0.594	0.634	0.673
		(.01)	(.026)	(.052)	(.075)
	298	0.555	0.593	0.631	0.667
		(.01)	(.026)	(.051)	(.075)
	304	0.556	0.593	0.629	0.663
		(.01)	(.025)	(.051)	(.075)
	323	0.561	0.592	0.621	0.65
		(.009)	(.025)	(.051)	(.075)
	353	0.569	0.589	0.61	0.63
		(.009)	(.025)	(.051)	(.076)
	396	0.579	0.586	0.593	0.6

		(.01)	(.027)	(.054)	(.082)
	437	0.589	0.583	0.577	0.571
		(.013)	(.029)	(.059)	(.09)
	444	0.591	0.583	0.574	0.566
		(.013)	(.03)	(.06)	(.092)
	451	0.592	0.582	0.571	0.561
		(.014)	(.031)	(.064)	(.094)
	452	0.593	0.582	0.571	0.56
		(.014)	(.031)	(.062)	(.094)
	494	0.603	0.579	0.554	0.53
		(.017)	(.035)	(.07)	(.106)
	508	0.606	0.578	0.549	0.519
		(.018)	(.037)	(.073)	(.11)
	569	0.621	0.573	0.524	0.475
		(.022)	(.044)	(.086)	(.13)
	577	0.623	0.572	0.521	0.469
		(.023)	(.045)	(.088)	(.132)
	636	0.636	0.568	0.497	0.426
		(.027)	(.054)	(.103)	(.151)

Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix Two

Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences for Democrats in the 104th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
Time	22	0.743	0.837	0.901	0.942
		(.035)	(.034)	(.036)	(.032)
	63	0.752	0.835	0.895	0.934
		(.03)	(.031)	(.035)	(.034)

84	0.756 (.027)	0.834 (.029)	0.891 (.035)	0.93 (.034)
96	0.759 (.026)	0.834 (.028)	0.889 (.034)	0.927 (.034)
137	0.768 (.021)	0.833 (.025)	0.882 (.033)	0.918 (.036)
210	0.783 (.014)	0.83 (.021)	0.868 (.032)	0.899 (.038)
215	0.784 (.014)	0.83 (.021)	0.867 (.032)	0.897 (.038)
291	0.799 (.008)	0.827 (.018)	0.851 (.033)	0.873 (.044)
298	0.8 (.008)	0.826 (.018)	0.85 (.033)	0.87 (.044)
304	0.801 (.008)	0.826 (.018)	0.848 (.033)	0.868 (.045)
323	0.805 (.008)	0.825 (.018)	0.844 (.034)	0.861 (.047)
353	0.811 (.008)	0.824 (.019)	0.837 (.036)	0.849 (.051)
396	0.818 (.01)	0.823 (.02)	0.827 (.039)	0.831 (.058)
437	0.825 (.012)	0.821 (.023)	0.816 (.044)	0.812 (.067)
444	0.827 (.012)	0.821 (.023)	0.814 (.045)	0.808 (.069)
451	0.828 (.013)	0.82 (.023)	0.813 (.046)	0.805 (.071)
452	0.828	0.82	0.812	0.804

		(.013)	(.024)	(.046)	(.071)
	494	0.835	0.819	0.801	0.782
		(.015)	(.027)	(.052)	(.083)
	508	0.837	0.818	0.797	0.774
		(.016)	(.028)	(.054)	(.087)
	569	0.847	0.816	0.78	0.739
		(.02)	(.033)	(.066)	(.109)
	577	0.848	0.815	0.777	0.734
		(.02)	(.034)	(.067)	(.112)
	636	0.857	0.813	0.759	0.695
		(.023)	(.04)	(.081)	(.136)

Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix Three

Predicted Probability of Voting for the President's Preferences for Republicans in the 104th Congress with Margins of Less Than 10%

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2	Visits=3
Margin	0.5	0.266	0.542	0.795	0.927
		(.07)	(.16)	(.193)	(.119)
	1	0.261	0.515	0.761	0.905
		(.061)	(.15)	(.203)	(.142)
	1.5	0.256	0.487	0.724	0.879
		(.053)	(.138)	(.21)	(.168)
	2	0.251	0.459	0.683	0.845
		(.046)	(.127)	(.216)	(.195)
	2.5	0.246	0.432	0.64	0.805
		(.038)	(.115)	(.216)	(.222)
	3	0.241	0.405	0.593	0.758
		(.032)	(.104)	(.214)	(.248)

3.5	0.236 (.026)	0.379 (.094)	0.546 (.209)	0.703 (.27)
4	0.231 (.022)	0.353 (.085)	0.497 (.202)	0.642 (.286)
4.5	0.227 (.021)	0.328 (.078)	0.449 (.193)	0.575 (.295)
5	0.222 (.022)	0.304 (.072)	0.401 (.182)	0.506 (.295)
5.5	0.218 (.025)	0.281 (.068)	0.355 (.172)	0.437 (.288)
6	0.213 (.029)	0.259 (.066)	0.312 (.161)	0.37 (.273)
6.5	0.209 (.034)	0.239 (.065)	0.272 (.151)	0.307 (.252)
7	0.204 (.039)	0.219 (.065)	0.235 (.141)	0.251 (.228)
7.5	0.2 (.045)	0.201 (.065)	0.202 (.131)	0.202 (.202)
8	0.2 (.05)	0.184 (.066)	0.172 (.121)	0.161 (.175)
8.5	0.192 (.055)	0.168 (.067)	0.146 (.117)	0.127 (.15)
9	0.188 (.06)	0.153 (.067)	0.123 (.102)	0.099 (.127)
9.5	0.184 (.065)	0.139 (.067)	0.104 (.093)	0.077 (.106)
10	0.18 (.07)	0.126 (.067)	0.087 (.084)	0.059 (.088)

Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix Four

Predicted Probability of Voting in Favor of the President's Preferences in the 108th Congress

		Visits=0	Visits=1	Visits=2
	136	0.396	0.479	0.563
		(.033)	(.049)	(.092)
	185	0.422	0.487	0.554
		(.028)	(.043)	(.082)
	199	0.429	0.49	0.551
		(.026)	(.041)	(.079)
	246	0.455	0.498	0.542
		(.02)	(.036)	(.071)
	269	0.467	0.502	0.537
		(.017)	(.034)	(.067)
	319	0.494	0.511	0.527
		(.012)	(.03)	(.061)
Time	452	0.567	0.534	0.501
		(.014)	(.028)	(.059)
	535	0.611	0.548	0.484
		(.023)	(.035)	(.069)
	549	0.618	0.551	0.481
		(.025)	(.036)	(.071)
	617	0.652	0.562	0.468
		(.032)	(.044)	(.084)
	626	0.657	0.564	0.466
		(.033)	(.045)	(.087)
	633	0.66	0.565	0.465
		(.034)	(.046)	(.087)

Standard errors in parentheses

[i] Key domestic and economic policy votes on which the president took a position were identified by Congressional Quarterly. CQ defines a key vote as a vote that is 1. "a matter of major controversy"; 2. "a matter of presidential or political power"; or 3. "a matter of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans" ("How CQ Picks Key Votes" 2007). CQ identifies presidential position taking on votes by "analyzing his messages to Congress, news conference remarks and other public statements and documents" ("Explanation of Statistics, Cont'd" 2007).
[ii] Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/>.
[iii] An example of a visit made by President Clinton in 1994 was when he remarked, "You have a chance to replace…two Members of Congress that are leaving with Mike Doyle and Bill Leavens, and I hope you will vote for them" (Clinton 1994). Another example of a visit was President Bush's comment to members of Jim Nussle's district that "it's in your best interest to make sure that Jim Nussle is reelected to the United States Congress" (Bush 2002).
[iv] The percentage of the vote received by each member and his or her closest opponent was obtained from the CQ Almanac Online.
[v] It was difficult to be consistent in the precise amount of time between the approval ratings and each vote because Gallup's polls were not taken at consistent time intervals. I used the job approval rating closest to a given vote unless the rating was from the five days before that vote. Although this five day period is a somewhat arbitrary, I felt that I needed to account for a potential gap between the time that polls were taken and the time that polls were released. I am interested in the way in which members of Congress might alter their voting behavior in response to presidential popularity, so ensuring that members of Congress were aware of the president's approval rating at the time of each vote was as important as the approval rating itself. Unfortunately, Gallup's website does not indicate the date that they released the president's job approval ratings. I decided on a five day period after a survey of Gallup's recent press releases about the president's approval ratings, most of which were released three days after polls were taken. I added an additional two days to this period to account for the fact that polls may have been released more slowly during the Clinton and Bush administrations. The extra two days also account for the possibility that some members of Congress may not have seen the president's job approval ratings right after they were released. President Clinton's job approval ratings are available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116584/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Bill-Clinton.aspx#1>. President George W. Bush's job approval ratings are available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx>.
[vi] Only the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scale was used in the two data sets. The first dimension measures a member's position on a liberal-conservative scale on issues of government intervention in the economy. The second dimension accounts for the North-South racial conflict before the Civil War and during the conflict over civil rights until the mid-1970s. This dimension was not included in the two data sets because it is no longer significant. After the end of the battle for civil rights, racial issues increasingly became issues of economic redistribution that could be captured along the first dimension. According to Poole, "Voting on race related issues now largely takes place along the liberal-conservative dimension and the old split in the Democratic Party between North and South has largely disappeared" (Poole 2007, 3).
[vii] This information was obtained from CQ's Voting and Elections Collection online. It is available at <http://library.cqpress.com/elections/candidatehistories.php>.
[viii] For example, in order to get the predicted probability of voting in favor of the president's policy preference on the 22nd day of Congress, the day of the first vote included in the data, I

held time, visits, and timexvisits at the following values: time=22, visits=0, and timexvisits=0; time=22, visits=1, and timexvisits=22; time=22, visits=2, and timexvisits=44; and time=22, visits=3, and timexvisits=66.

[ix] The predicted probabilities of voting in support of the president's preferences when visits equals three ought to be considered with caution because only one member of the 104th Congress received three visits.

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